The Government's 1990 telecommunications policy statement[176] was delivered to Parliament on November 8. It reflected acceptance by Cabinet of the `Beazley model' for a duopoly carrier structure but also reflected both industry pressure for further change and Labor Party and consumer pressure for industry and consumer safeguards.
The statement was a marked contrast to the 1988 Policy Statement. The earlier Statement, over 200 pages long, included a clear statement of policy objectives, detailed discussion on why and how changes would be made and clear recommendations reflecting both policy objectives and the detailed rationale for change
The November Statement was a mere 15 pages long and did little more than set out general government decisions. The policy framework and rationale for each decision was not there. Further, some of the `decisions' were little more than statements of principle, giving little guidance on how they would be implemented.
Implementing the new policy involved three major tasks: the reform of the 1989 telecommunications structure to establish network competition, open up other areas to competition and develop competitive safeguards for the new structure; the merger of Telecom with OTC; and the sale of AUSSAT and licensing of its purchaser as second carrier.
The Telecommunications Policy Division (TPol) of DTC had overall carriage of all the tasks, but with significant input from several important sources. Two committees were formed within TPol to oversee two of the major tasks: the INCA team (Implementation of New Carrier Arrangements) and the Second Carrier Selection team. AUSTEL reports on resale, mobile services and, particularly, on interconnect arrangements were important components in the reforms. Inter-departmental committees also had carriage of two important issues: the merger of Telecom and OTC and the handling of community service obligations. Labor parliamentarians Roger Price, MP, Neil O'Keefe, MP and Senator Chris Schacht jointly oversaw the reforms from within government.
Apart from individual consultation, the main forum for discussion on implementation policy changes was the Ministerial Advisory Committee (MAC). The Committee, formed at Ministerial request, met regularly from late January throughout the development of policy and legislation. It was chaired by Roger Price, MP and later Neil O'Keefe, MP and its membership included representatives of unions, consumers, business and industry. The DTC also released drafts of the legislation for comment from industry, user, union and consumer organisations.
At MAC's first meeting, Price explained the pace of change had meant a lack of consultation and MAC was established to assist in obtaining broad community views. MAC members discussed the speed with which changes were occurring and `the problems this would cause in providing considered and representative community views. The problems were acknowledged but members agreed they should press ahead regardless'.[177]
From MAC's consumer representative's perspective, MAC was `extremely successful', especially on price control issues. Overall, however, the MAC process was `too little and too late'. There were `too many issues already settled and deals done' and too many `entrenched positions'.[178]
The Prime Minister's Parliamentary statement put the proposed changes squarely in the context of the government's larger micro-economic reforms, as part of the government's larger task `to sweep away those old arrangements and reshape our economy as a genuinely modern and competitive one'. The main policy objective was introducing more competition; the benefits of efficiency, improved services and reduced prices were the results which more competition would bring. The reforms would all lead to `benefits for Australia that are potentially limitless... massive private investment', more jobs, a fall in STD prices on major trunk routes and the creation of `substantial and enduring export opportunities'.[179]
More detailed policy objectives were spelled out in the resulting legislation.[180] Unlike 1988, however, those objectives were developed as part of the legislative package of change; they were not developed first to drive that change.
The basic thrust of policy change was more competition at two levels. One level of increased competition would come from inter-carrier competition with the possibility of a third carrier competing in cellular mobile services. The second level of competition would be among all service providers with each other and the carriers.
The first question was what the carriers would be allowed to do that no other service provider could. The 1990 Statement provided little clear guidance on the issue. The 1990 Statement lists the introduction of network competition, initially between only two licensed carriers, as one of the key elements of the reforms. Both Telecom/OTC and the second carrier:
... will be licensed to provide the full range of telecommunications facilities and services domestically and internationally, using all or any available technologies.[181]
The Statement did not explain what `network competition' meant or how `facilities' would be defined. Did facilities mean just telephone lines, did it include switching equipment? And where would the boundary of duopoly rights end - at the end of a wire, at switching or other equipment, at a radio transmission tower? The INCA group finally developed the concept of a facilities based reservation: the carrier reservation would include the exclusive right to `install and maintain line links between distinct places'.[182]
In DTC's view, putting the reservation in terms of facilities (lines/line links) rather than services avoided the difficulties of the 1989 regime in trying to separate reserved from value added services. Not including radiocommunications infrastructure in the reservation also avoided the 1989 difficulties of drawing boundary lines between exclusively radiocommunications services and telecommunications services. Large scale bypass of carriers' network infrastructure by radiocommunications would be dealt with by the service providers' class licence.
The reservation also did not include switching equipment. The DTC view was that carriers could use their exclusive right to install line links `to determine the location of public exchanges and other network equipment. They will have a de facto ability to control network planning and development' simply with the lines/line links reservation.[183]
AUSTEL's report on Resale had also recommended that service providers should be able to utilise any switching facilities and therefore switching equipment should not be reserved to carriers.[184] Excluding switching from the reservation gave `effect to AUSTEL's recommendation'.[185]
The reservation was only for of infrastructure only `between distinct places'. Within a distinct place, any service provider could supply their own facilities for private networks. And the reservation was to `install and maintain' facilities. Carriers would be able to provide services. But so would private network operators and other service providers, as provision of service was not included in carrier reservations. Again, the recommendation was largely a reflection of AUSTEL's Resale Report recommending no restriction on the types of services resellers and private network operators can provide.[186]
An important issue in infrastructure competition was where the boundary line between carrier network and network open to competition would be drawn. As a result of the 1989 changes, the network termination point (NTP) was the first wall socket or the MDF. The 1990 Statement implied, however, the NTP might be changed, saying the DTC would `bring forward' a report to government on the `appropriate' NTP before `new carrier arrangements' were implemented.[187]
In April, Minister Beazley announced that the 1989 NTP would remain until 30 June 1993. After that, the NTP would be the property boundary, unless a customer contracted otherwise with a carrier.[188] MAC members expressed concern about the statement, saying the proposed new NPT was `impractical for residential customers'. MAC members resolved to write to the Minister `conveying their views that the NTP should remain as present until such time as technology is developed which could change the location of the NTP'[189]. Ultimately, the legislation preserved the 1989 NTP but allowed it to be changed by regulations.[190]
The 1990 Statement envisaged both carriers competing in providing `a full range of telecommunications services using both satellite and terrestrial technologies'.[191] The difficulty in drafting a carrier reservation covering satellite capacity, however, was that the two carriers accessed satellite capacity in different ways. OTC had the right to allocate and market satellite capacity acquired as signatory to the INTELSAT and INMARSAT agreements. A merged Telecom/OTC would retain those signatory rights. The second carrier, on the other hand, would, in purchasing AUSSAT shares, acquire the capacity of AUSSAT satellites. The only guidance in the 1990 Statement on handling the issue was the `decision' that the Minister would `report' on ensuring second carrier access to INTELSAT and INMARSAT capacity.[192]
The draft legislation handled the satellite capacity issue by defining carrier rights over satellite capacity in service rather than facilities terms.[193] Only a carrier could be the initial supplier of telecommunications services between distinct places using satellite based facilities. Service providers and resellers could, however, provide telecommunications services using satellite capacity obtained from the carriers.[194]
The other issue was second carrier access to INTELSAT and INMARSAT capacity. As reported to MAC, the government decided that the `signatory' would make `suitable arrangements' for `qualified carriers' to have `direct and separate' access on operational, financial and technical matters to INTELSAT and INMARSAT and each `qualified carrier' would have full membership of Australian delegations for INMARSAT and INTELSAT. The carrier with the `larger system usage' would be `signatory'.[195]
The other carrier reservation covered by the 1990 Policy Statement was over CMT, or Public Mobile Telecommunications Service (PMTS). The 1990 Statement adopted the earlier government decision to accept AUSTEL's recommendations on mobile telephony. The two carriers would each be licensed to provide PMTS and a third PMTS operator would be licensed after the second carrier was licensed to provide PMTS. The issue of additional mobile licences would be considered in 1995.[196]
The Statement also `prima facie' accepted AUSTEL's earlier recommendation on PMTS using GSM technology which could, it was argued, support three PMTS providers. In the meantime, Telecom would continue to provide airtime on the existing analogue system. AUSTEL would report further on the implementation of its earlier recommendations on mobile telephony.[197]
The legislation largely reflected AUSTEL's concept of PMTS: the definition was technology neutral, it distinguished PMTS from other mobile services, and it included services supplied solely by radiocommunications.[198] The definition was also in service, not facilities terms. It was `an impossible task' to try to distinguish facilities reserved to general carriers from those used in providing PMTS.[199]
Providing a competitor to Telecom/OTC was only one step in opening up competition. Resale of private network capacity was high on industry's agenda for liberalisation. AUSTEL's report on public access cordless telephone services (PACTS) had recommended open competition. And some recommendations on liberalising the first telephone monopoly had already been implemented. The 1990 Statement reflected policy decisions to liberalise competition in those areas as well.
AUSTEL had recommended liberalising the `common interest' test for resale of private network capacity. The Statement not only accepted that recommendation, but went further, recommending that all restrictions on resale of domestic and international capacity be removed.[200]
The other of the Statement's policy decision was that AUSTEL report to government by mid December on the terms and conditions under which resale would be allowed and whether resellers could establish their own switching capacity. AUSTEL should also advise on how to prevent carriers from discriminating against private network providers and resellers in the provision and charging of network capacity and services.[201]
AUSTEL's report recommended that resellers should be viewed as customers of the carriers, along with other service providers and provided with carrier capacity on non-discriminatory commercial pricing arrangements. They should be free to provide services and their own switching capacity. Any restrictions would be contained in a class licence, including both technical regulation and restrictions on using radiocommunications infrastructure to provide telecommunications services to other people. There would be special arrangements for international resale of capacity.[202]
Under the 1989 regime, private networks could be established under certain conditions. If the private networks used carrier capacity, they had to be used by groups with a `common interest' and resale of the capacity was not permitted. Liberalisation of the resale restrictions therefore opened up the provision of private networks using carrier capacity.
Networks could also be constructed privately, but only within property boundaries. The draft legislation also eased that restriction, allowing construction of private networks within distinct places which could include several contiguous properties, provided there was a principal user for all the properties.[203]
The 1990 Statement accepted AUSTEL's earlier report on mobile telephony including its recommendation that PACTS be open to full competition. Details of the licensing of PACTS would be worked out as part of the licensing arrangements.[204]
Like PMTS, the definition of PACTS was service, not facilities based, and for many of the same reasons. The final definition of PACTS was very similar to that used for PMTS; the primary difference being that PACTS could not be used continuously while a person moved from place to place.
The main difference reflected between the services in the legislation was licensing. PMTS operators would be restricted in number and individually licensed as carriers. Following the AUSTEL recommendations, PACTS providers would be subject only to a Class Licence.
Many of the submissions to ROSA had stressed the need for adequate competitive safeguards, given Telecom and OTC's overwhelming dominance in the market. Beazley's Cabinet submission said there was `little doubt' the `adequacy of the competitive safeguards will be more important in determining the level of competition and its impact and viability than the actual carrier structure chosen'.[205] The 1990 Statement reflected the Government's concern for competitive safeguards.
Many of the Statement's decisions dealt with proposed safeguards; other decisions strengthened AUSTEL's powers to monitor and enforce the safeguards covered carrier interconnection and access, as well as reasonable access to network and services by other competitors as well.
Interconnection and equal access arrangements are the backbone of carrier competition. The arrangements determine both the physical interconnection of carrier infrastructure and the cost to a second carrier of interconnection. Interconnect arrangements also determine the ease with which customers and users can access all carriers.
The Statement set out `decisions' on both the technical and economic aspects of interconnect arrangements, leaving AUSTEL to make detailed recommendations on the very complex issues involved. The Telecom/OTC merger would not proceed until AUSTEL certified to the Minister that interconnection and equal access arrangements were in place in all capital cities, with an agreed timetable for similar arrangements in provincial cities.[206]
AUSTEL's final reports to the Minister on all aspects of interconnection and equal access were complete by June 1991.[207] The reports were the culmination of six months of consultation and the publication of discussion papers[208], to provide the basis for public comment on the range of issues involved.
The Statement's `decisions' on charges looked more like statements of principle, mainly concerned with how inter-carrier charges should be determined. Inter-carrier charges would be levied at `directly attributable incremental cost to Telecom and would include allowance for other expenditure incurred by Telecom in providing interconnection. Charges for interconnection by all competitors would both cover all Telecom's related costs in providing the service and underpin Telecom's meeting its community service obligations.[209] The charges were to be set `expeditiously' and, in the first instance, through carrier negotiation. AUSTEL, however, would have final responsibility for the determination of the charges.[210]
AUSTEL's Interim Report on the Economic and Commercial Considerations of interconnection highlighted a number of issues the Statement raised: if the charges were to be on a directly attributable incremental cost (DAIC) basis, how `attributable' to service costs did Telecom/OTC expenditure have to be, and would DAIC be on a short or long term costs basis. There were other issues facing AUSTEL including identification and valuation of assets, how to deal with capital investment, the cost of capital, elasticities, CSOs, what international best practice meant, and whether interconnect charges should be on-going or set only for a set period or until specific events occurred.
Part One of AUSTEL's report on charging included detailed discussion on issues including charging principles, detailed definitions of terminology and costing methodologies applied, recommendations on how the inter-carrier interconnect charges should be levied and triggers when the inter-carrier charging regime based on DAIC costing would be replaced with rates based on commercial negotiations. The second report to the Minister gave detailed recommendations on initial interconnect charges for the second carrier, based on AUSTEL's costing principles and methodology.[211]
MAC received a briefing on AUSTEL's recommendations for interconnect arrangements in April by AUSTEL Member Alex Arena. MAC members asked whether the charges `should be used to encourage the second carrier to move faster in rolling out its network'. Arena said it was possible and was `the next step of refinement'.[212]. AUSTEL's final report did just that by recommending that the favourable DAIC based charging rates apply only when the second carrier had established a `point of interconnect' in the relevant charging area. Otherwise, interconnect charges would be set through commercial negotiation.[213]
The Statement's decisions on interconnection and access also dealt in some detail with access to network infrastructure and services by the second carrier. Telecom/OTC would face a number of requirements: to share ducts and radio sites, to comply with technical interconnect standards, to provide capacity and allow the second carrier to establish a point of interconnection within `each closed numbering area', to provide ancillary and supplementary services including billing, to carry and complete calls on behalf of the second carrier and provide necessary information on customers and network traffic.[214] AUSTEL would have power to set the standards necessary for carrier interconnection.[215]
Again, it was left to AUSTEL to work out the complex detail on a range of technical/operational issues. AUSTEL's report contained detailed recommendations on call handling issues, planning principles and mechanisms for the carriers, operational and service management systems and arrangements for ancillary facilities and services
From a consumer perspective, one of the most important technical issues was how to access the carriers. AUSTEL's Discussion Paper on Customer Access Arrangements raised several of the issues involved: customer ease in accessing carriers, the impact on a second carrier of different dial code options, the impact on competition of retaining a `default' to Telecom/ OTC, the arguments for customers preselecting a carrier and of that preselection being done by a ballot process.[216]
In his briefing to MAC, Alex Arena discussed the options: customers dialling a two digit prefix for STD and IDD calls whatever carrier is used, or customers dialling a prefix for the second carrier only. In the longer term, customer preselection of a carrier was AUSTEL's favoured option.[217] MAC's recommendation[218], adopted by AUSTEL and the Government, was for the second option for interim dial access.
`Stringent' accounting was necessary if the government's goals of carrier efficiency and effective competition were to be met. The danger was that Telecom/OTC might cross subsidise its less profitable activities rather than improve efficiencies across the board. Cross subsidies could also `foster predatory activities' allowing a carrier to subsidise its activities subject to more competition by its activities less subject to competitive pressures.[219]
Telecom/OTC would be required to quote separate charges for individual services. Both carriers must also cooperate with AUSTEL in developing a Chart of Accounts and Cost Allocation Manual, and comply with that manual, keeping separate accounts for local, trunk, mobile, international and value added services.[220] Those requirements were incorporated in the legislation[221] although the Chart of Accounts and Cost Allocation Manual could obviously not be completed until the merger of Telecom/OTC and the establishment of a second carrier.
Most of the Statement's decisions on pricing concerned charges to ordinary consumers. The Statement decisions also included the requirement that Telecom/OTC must charge on a uniform basis, except where price differences reflect demonstrated cost differences. One implication of that decision is that prices for consumers can be `deaveraged', a concept discussed earlier. The other implication, however, meant that all competitors must be charged for access to the network and services on a non-discriminatory basis - an important competitive safeguard.[222] Those non discriminatory pricing requirements were incorporated in legislation, although the exact meaning of the requirement has been the subject of AUSTEL determination and is now being challenged in court.[223]
The primary focus of the 1990 Statement was on how more competition in telecommunications could be introduced and maintained: through the creation of a second carrier, the opening up of resale and mobile markets and the development of effective competition safeguards.
The Statement also included policy goals for consumers. `No householder or ordinary subscriber in rural areas' would be disadvantaged by the reforms.[224] The reforms would ensure that prices fell in real terms across a range of services; untimed calls would continue to be offered and rural and remote services would `not vanish'.[225] And AUSTEL would annually review and report to government on all arrangements including customer satisfaction and customer benefits, including quality of service.[226]
The policy decisions flagged some of the consumer protection measures incorporated in the 1991 structure. Community Service Obligations would continue to be delivered and funded, detailed price controls would be developed and the current access to untimed local calls would be guaranteed. Many consumer issues, however, were not addressed in the Statement and only picked up during the consultation processes.
Social policy aspects of telecommunications were, under the 1989 regime, addressed through Telecom's Community Service Obligations: Telecom both provided CSOs and funded them through cross subsidies.
The BTCE's Report on CSO costs had divided CSOs into three categories: provision of loss making basic service and infrastructure, losses made in providing public telephones, and concessions (offered by Telecom to public institutions and people with disabilities, plus concessions paid by Government welfare departments).[227] It was a conceptual division of CSO's reflected in the 1990 Statement, refined by an IDC and incorporated in the 1991 legislation.
The Statement pledged that Telecom/OTC would continue to provide and maintain `basic telephone services to residential and business customers' throughout Australia.[228] Other aspects of CSOs - the maintenance of service to rural and regional areas and to pensioners and to people with disabilities - would also be addressed. Funding of CSO's would, however, change. In the Government's view, the funding of CSO's through cross subsidies would not be sustainable in a duopoly or multi carrier environment. As a DTC representative explained to MAC:
It would be increasingly unsustainable to require Telecom to continue to meet the majority of the cost of the Government's social and economic policy for telecommunications through internal cross subsidisation if other carriers made no contribution. This would result in the inefficient distortion of market prices between carriers, would be inequitable and would be inconsistent with the thrust of the ALPs new platform with telecommunications. [229]
Therefore, the Statement said interconnection and other charges would `underpin' Telecom/OTC's CSO costs `on a pro rata basis'.[230] Because the management and funding of CSOs `raise complex issues' the Statement said that funding and delivery of CSOs would be referred to an Inter-departmental Committee (IDC) for report.[231]
The IDC's recommendations on CSOs were announced by the Minister in April.[232] The Report split Telecom's CSOs into three broad groups:
* universal service (i.e. access to a standard telephone service, including
pay phones)
* emergency services
* concessions (to disabled and charitable organisations)[233]
The IDC Report did not discuss in detail what carrier would be responsible for providing the universal service aspect of the CSOs; it assumed the obligation would met by Telecom/OTC. Funding of the loss making services was the issue.
In the IDC's view, `should a carrier not be compensated for loss making services, it will seek to cross subsidise those services'.[234] There were two broad options for that compensation: funding from general revenues or industry funding (carrier levy, user levy or cross-subsidy).[235] The IDC said that `some form of carrier' levy was the `most obvious mechanism' for ensuring contribution by the second carrier to universal service costs - and would be in line with the Statement's policy decision that CSO costs be underpinned by interconnect and other charges. A levy based on revenue from each carrier's reserved areas was also suggested as a more competitively neutral form of funding. [236]
Emergency services, another aspect of CSOs, would be provided by both carriers as a condition of their licence - and without compensation. `It should be regarded as a standard function of a carrier'.[237]
Concessions, the third aspect of CSOs, were in two categories: those provided by Telecom and those provided out of consolidated revenue. The Report suggested Telecom might continue providing currently available concessions either as a `good corporate citizen' or because of `clear marketing advantages'. Therefore, the Report suggested that making specific concessions a licence condition should be `minimised' although they might be imposed later if necessary.[238] Concessions provided by government under the Telephone Rental Concession Scheme would continue.[239]
The IDC Report flagged that, in the longer term, `there may need to review delivery and funding arrangements for CSOs....[240] MAC also stressed the need for review of the CSO structures.
In longer term there may need to be a review of the delivery and funding arrangements for CSOs adopted by Government...The actual impact of competition on market structure for telecommunications is sure to have access and equity implications and require adjustments so that any assistance continues to be targeted appropriately.[241]
And, in MAC's view, that review would need to take account of access issues including the cost of access, usage costs and how access and usage costs are unbundled, calling patterns, the impact of various charging structures on different user groups including people with physical disabilities, language difficulties and people on low incomes.[242]
In the end, the legislation largely reflected the IDC Report on CSOs. The old CSO term was replaced with a `universal service obligation' which required the declared universal service carrier or carriers to provide a standard telephone service and payphones to `all people in Australia on an equitable basis wherever they reside or carry on business'.[243] The `standard telephone service' was defined in more technical terms than the 1989 definition, but provided for changes to the definition by regulations.[244]
Compensation for providing loss making universal service was not,however, through interconnect charges; it was felt that adding USO costs onto interconnect charges would drive their cost up and encourage infrastructure duplication.[245] Instead, compensation for provision of loss making standard telephone service and payphones would be through a levy on `participating carriers' based on their share of timed traffic.[246]
MAC Chairman Roger Price reflected his Committee's concern with the new universal service obligation and its need for review. Speaking in June 1991 at a Consumers' Telecommunications Network seminar, he said:
On the issue of universal service, I am pleased that the Minister is going to write to the Prime Minister seeking a wider inquiry into the concept of universal service. All too often we have accepted that the definition of universal service ought to be the penetration rate of telephones per household. While we have accomplished a lot in Australia in terms of high penetration rate this, of course, is an all too narrow definition. Universal service has application not only in rural and remote areas where we traditionally think of it, but also, and more particularly in urban areas. It is a question not only of people having access to telecommunications, but it is also about maintaining them on the service.
To Roger Price's later regret, `Hawke reneged' on holding the promised CSO inquiry.[247]
The Statement's policy decisions on price controls were more explicit. Price controls would apply only to Telecom/OTC. The unstated rationale may have been that Telecom/OTC, as the dominant provider of services to domestic consumers, should be subject to price controls. It was probably also assumed that, as competitors entered the domestic market, they would be unlikely to price their products above Telecom/OTC's offerings.
The decisions recognised that Telecom/OTC would be allowed to deaverage and rebalance costs to reflect `demonstrated cost differences'. However, the price changes would only be allowed within price controls. Telecom/OTC would continue to be subject to price caps, with separate caps for local, trunk and international services.
The price caps would be further reviewed by government and the value of the `X' in the CPI minus X formula would be increased, reflecting achievable efficiency gains. Those prices currently reserved to Telecom would be subject to Ministerial notification and disallowance. Finally, both carriers would be required to offer customers continued access to untimed local calls.[248]
The untimed local call pledge was easily accommodated. The legislation required any carrier to continue to offer untimed local calls to residential customers and charitable or welfare organisations in all areas where the service was offered at the commencement of the Act.[249]
Appropriate price controls were a more difficult issue. As the MAC Minutes record, the tensions were between setting price controls which could protect consumers from the worst effects of price deaveraging and rebalancing yet not be so restrictive that Telecom/OTC's `ability to rebalance and price close to cost could not be achieved' or inhibit the government's overall competition objectives.[250]
The basic structure of price controls were contained in the AOTC Act. The Minister can determine that specified carrier charges are subject to price controls. Charges subject to controls can be declared as subject to notification and disallowance; they can also be included in price cap or other price control arrangements. Those charges subject to notification and disallowance can only be altered after the Minister has been given 30 days notice of the change and allowed it to proceed.[251] Specific price controls are then determined by government (usually within DTC) in consultation with AUSTEL and Telecom.
The first price controls determined by government were set on 2 September 1991 and applied to both Telecom and OTC (they had not yet been merged). Essentially, the carriers' charges for rentals and for local, trunk and international calls were subject to an overall price cap of four percentage points less than the rate of inflation (expressed as CPI - 4). Charges for a range of other Telecom services were also subject to notification and disallowance.[252] That Determination has since been superseded by a later Determination on price controls, covering the period 1992 to 1995.[253]
The 1990 Statement was primarily concerned with developing new competitive structures and safeguards: apart from its brief discussion on CSOs and pricing, it said little on how the changes might affect consumers and what safeguards should be established. Other consumer protection measures included in the legislation were largely the result of MAC consultations and representations by consumer organisations.
The Statement had charged AUSTEL with reporting annually on customer satisfaction and customer benefits, including quality of service. While the Exposure Draft required AUSTEL's annual report to review `the adequacy and quality of services and facilities' supplied by carriers, there was no explicit requirement for AUSTEL to assess customer benefits and satisfaction resulting from the reforms.[254] There still isn't.[255]
One of the first criticisms made of the Exposure Draft of the Telecommunications Bill was the lack of any `clear requirement of, and mechanisms for, consideration of consumer concerns'.[256] The Exposure Draft gave AUSTEL specific consumer protection functions, dealing mainly with handling complaints and monitoring charges paid by consumers. There was no overriding responsibility to have regard to consumer concerns in carrying out competition functions.[257]
The Exposure Draft also had no defined process for public consultation. The procedure consumers proposed was that, when a public inquiry was to be held, public notice should be given, a discussion paper on the inquiry be developed and publicly available, any member of the public should be able to make submissions, public hearings should be held where appropriate and any report resulting from the inquiry be made public.[258] An almost identical procedure was incorporated in the final legislation.[259]
Consumers also argued for a special category of licence condition which dealt with public interest/consumer protection issues. Before such conditions were determined, altered or revoked, the public inquiry process should be used. That suggestion was not adopted and, while the legislation did include a public inquiry process, there are very few situations in which the process must be followed.[260]
Both the 1990 Statement and Exposure Draft had required AUSTEL to report on the quality of service provided by carriers. The Exposure Draft, however, contained no requirement on AUSTEL to establish or alter service quality standards or monitor compliance with the standards. Consumer organisations recommended that AUSTEL be empowered to set service quality standards and that compliance with those standards be made a licence condition.[261]
Other issues raised by consumer organisations included the need for established carrier complaints handling procedures, carrier requirements to, free of charge, identify and repair faults within carrier networks and the need for carriers to provide accurate billing and charging systems. Most of the suggestions were included in licence conditions on carriers.[262]
AUSTEL's role would also be expanded to oversee the changes. It would be given an additional, specific function to promote competition. Its other new powers and functions would cover the interconnect and access arrangements, responsibility for the national numbering plan, development and oversight of cost allocation decisions, additional responsibility in technical standards, oversight of the price controls and additional power to arbitrate interconnect disputes.[263] The legislation largely reflected the 1990 Statement decisions.[264]
The major issue raised both within MAC and by consumer organisations was the extent of the Minister's power, particularly in relation to awarding carrier licences, determining licence conditions, and directing AUSTEL on a range of specific issues..
One of MAC's recommendations was that the Ministerial powers of direction be in line with Australian Securities Commission legislation. That model requires Ministerial notification to the agency before issuing a direction and giving the agency adequate opportunity to discuss with the Minister the need for the proposed direction. Any directions given must be published and laid before Parliament. The MAC meeting also decided that DTC `should explain why the general ministerial discretion proposed will not cover the specific ministerial discretions provided in different parts of the Act'.[265]
At the next MAC meeting, Ms Fanning of DTC said that concerns about ministerial powers of direction were `an overstated problem'. And, she added: `the Minister wishes to retain his discretion to exercise what are essentially reserve powers and if the committee still has concerns they should be taken up directly with the Minister as a policy matter.[266] The breadth of Ministerial powers of direction and determination were retained in the final legislation.
Much of the criticism of the `Beazley model' had been its creation of a carrier duopoly rather than open network competition. As the Minister argued in his Cabinet submission, however, open competition would be a `high risk approach' to broad based competition. The transition to open competition would be `sudden and could involve substantial dislocation. The entry of new competitors could be `deterred by the market dominance of the incumbent carriers'.[267]
In a duopoly structure, the new entrant could `strive for market share on a relatively stable and predictable basis' and thus `optimise its investment strategy. Infrastructure duplication would be `minimised'. And the government's ability to manage issues such as competitive safeguards, CSOs and industry policy would be `much less complex in a duopoly environment'.[268]
The Prime Minister spoke of the `first phase of competition' in which AUSTEL and the Trade Practices Commission can ensure Telecom/OTC does not `unduly exploit its entrenched position'. However, the duopoly must have `a finite term'. The 1990 Statement's decision was that the `new carrier arrangements will be subject to a sunset clause to come into effect on 30 June 1997'.[269]
MAC's `general view' was that it would not be necessary or appropriate to review whether the duopoly continued past 1997. MAC did, however, feel there should, after around three years, be a broad based, independent public review covering the operations of the duopoly, past and expected developments and progress towards achieving improved economic and service benefits.MAC Minutes of Fifth Meeting, 8 March 1991. In a letter to the Minister about the review, Chairman Price said the reason a review was being proposed was `to ensure that the monitoring mechanisms are put in place early to establish data to be collected on the performance of the two carriers. This will allow the review to undertake its work with adequate information at its disposal.'[270]
Most of the challenges in translating the policy intent of 1990 Statement into legislation concerned the telecommunications structure and the development of competitive safeguards. Yet the two other major tasks, the merger of Telecom with OTC and the licensing of a second carrier presented issues of their own.
The first of the Statement's decisions was that Telecom and OTC would be merged to form a `new incorporated company' and the merged carrier `will be maintained in full public ownership.[271] The two organisations would, however, continue to trade as two separate entities until AUSTEL certified to the Minister that interconnect and access arrangements were in place. Until the merger was complete, there would be an `interim board' including representatives of both Telecom and OTC to deal with major capital expenditure and corporate restructure.[272]
The new company would have share capital, but with provision for direction by the Minister for Transport and Communications `as representative of the sole owner'. It would still be subject to Loan Council processes. The new entity would also not be subject to any laws or obligations also binding on the second carrier, but also would not enjoy any privileges or immunities not enjoyed the second carrier.[273]
The Government quickly established an inter-departmental committee composed of representatives from Transport and Communications, Prime Minister and Cabinet, Treasury and Finance, to oversee the merger. The IDC's specific mandate, under the 1990 policy Statement, was to report on a merger fee for the two, possible structural separation of the new entity, its capital structure and management of its business interests in the value added markets.[274] The `INCA' team within DTC would be responsible for drafting the merger legislation.
A company, the Commonwealth Telecommunications Interim Board Limited, was also formed. The main functions of the Interim Board included selecting a Chief Executive Officer for the new entity, preparing the two entities' structures for the merger and coordinating both Telecom and OTC comment on the merger legislation. Its Board members were appointed in December 1990 and included as Chair, OTC Chairman David Hoare plus additional members from Telecom and the ACTU.
GBEs were subject to a range of government policies covering industrial and human resource policies, administrative law accountabilities and requirements such as the need for Loans Council approval and industry assistance measures. As agents of the crown, however, they also benefited from certain immunities from prosecution. The issue for determination was, on the one hand, the extent to which Telecom/OTC would continue to be subject to government policies and, on the other, the extent to which Telecom's immunity from many provisions of the law would be retained.
The Government decision, announced in April, was that carriers should, as far as practicable, be subject to State and Territory laws; immunity from those laws should only extend to specified telecommunications activities. Therefore, the merged Telecom/OTC would no longer be entitled to blanket immunity or privilege of the Commonwealth.[275] This was achieved in the legislation establishing the merged entity.[276] AUSTEL was also empowered to determine ceilings for carrier liability in tort.
Carriers would be allowed to engage in exempt activities necessary for the provision of telecommunications infrastructure and services in spite of the operation of state and territory legislation.[277] However, they would be subject to a National Code, covering environmental, planning, design and safety requirements.[278]
The merged entity would, however, remain subject to administrative law, defence, security and criminal law, human rights and equal opportunity law and privacy law.[279] The difficulty was that the wording of section 26 of the AOTC Act which removed the entity's immunities also had the effect of removing Telecom/OTC from the jurisdiction of other Commonwealth law.[280] Special legislation/regulations was then needed to continue Government accountabilities.[281]
Finally, the government said that Telecom/OTC's continuing obligations under government legislation will be `subject to a review in 1993, or earlier if requested by the Telecom/OTC Board'.[282]
One of the major issues for Telecom and OTC was the possibility of having to pay government a merger fee, reportedly as much as $1 billion. In the end, Senate amendments to the legislation included removal of the new entity's obligation to pay a merger fee.[283]
The centrality of carrier competition in the policy reforms made the selection and licensing of a second carrier (and off-loading debt-ridden AUSSAT) a vital component of the changes. Indeed, one the first of the Statement's `decisions' was that AUSSAT would be given the second carrier licence and sold to form basis of the competing carrier.[284]
Some of the details of that process were covered by Statement decisions. AUSSAT's legislation would be amended, removing any restrictions on it to complete in the provision of all telecommunications infrastructure and services. The Government would purchase all Telecom's shares in AUSSAT (at its commercial value on 24 October, 1990) and the two Telecom representatives on AUSSAT's board would be removed.[285]
AUSSAT would then be licensed as the second carrier and then sold by tender, with the sale to be complete by December 31, 1991. The successful tenderer would need to satisfy all government's telecommunications policy objectives and have the necessary `financial, technical and managerial skills' to be a successful competitor.[286] The one requirement on the new competitor would be to continue providing satellite services for remote television services (commercial and ABC), for defence purposes and for delivery of pay TV services.[287]
Very soon after the Statement was made, the AUSSAT Amendment Act 1991 was passed which made two important changes: it allowed AUSSAT to provide any domestic or international public telecommunications infrastructure or network and to provide access to international public telecommunications networks; and it allowed AUSTEL to direct another carrier to make available a telecommunications network or facility for AUSSAT use.[288] As Minister Beazley said, the provisions of the Act meant that the competition reforms could proceed even without the passage of a new or amended telecommunications act.[289]
The next immediate task for government was the selection of a second carrier, a task largely managed by the DTC Second Carrier Selection Team, comprising several departments and assisted by consultants, CS First Boston. Expressions of interest were due to government by January 1991, and from them, the government selected those who would be invited to bid for the licence.
Once the bidders were selected, the Government's Information Memorandum (with AUSSAT details, interconnection proposals etc) was scheduled to be distributed and the Request for Proposals expected from the favoured few prospects. Initial responses to the Proposals were to be in DTC hands by end of May with final tenders due by end of July, and a final recommendation on the second carrier to Cabinet by October.[290]
There was always some question about how many bids the government received for the second licence. Minister Beazley said the government had received `over 30 expressions of interest, with a formidable list of those remaining'.[291] Other commentators, however, suggested there were few or possibly only one real bidder.[292]
The final decision on the second carrier, however many real bidders there were, was for government, based on DTC advice. The Minister said, however, that the selection would be made on more than just price. He promised that the bidders `will be expected to submit strategies addressing technology and exports of products and services' and that those strategies `will be evaluated against the Government's expectations that they demonstrate long term, commercially sustainable benefits for Australian industry'. Final selection of the carrier would be based on `its ability and commitment to provide meaningful and advantageous competition. The second carrier would bring to Australia a highly competitive approach to providing telecommunications services which will rub off in all areas of the industry'.[293]
By the end of 1991, the sale of AUSSAT and the licensing of a second carrier had been largely complete. The AUSSAT Repeat Act 1991 was passed and assented to by October 21. In the end, the second carrier did not assume AUSSAT's debt: the government did. The Act allowed the government to appropriate up to $800,000,000 to pay out AUSSAT's existing debt.[294] It also provided that AUSSAT was no longer to have been taken as established for a public purpose,[295] thereby removing any Crown immunities, in much the same way as a similar provision did in the AOTC Act. Finally, the Act repealed the AUSSAT Act 1984.[296]
Optus Communications[297] was announced as the successful tenderer for the second licence on November 19, and, two days later, AUSSAT was awarded both a General Telecommunications Carrier licence and a Public Mobile Licence - both of which would be taken over by Optus. The carrier licence required AUSSAT (later Optus) to roll out its network in stages, with time limits on each state.[298] It must also supply satellite services for remote radio and television broadcasting licensees, public radio and television broadcasting licensees and the licensee of a pay television licence until 1 January 2005, or `such earlier date' as the Minister determines[299].
Optus signed a contract for sale of shares with the government on December 6, and paid $10 million to the Government, with the rest of what was reported to be approximately $800 million to be paid over three to four years.[300]
The Deed of Agreement signed by AUSSAT and the Government spelled out further details under which AUSSAT would operate as a general telecommunications carriers. The agreement required the government not to issue a general telecommuications licence other than to AUSSAT, Telecom or OTC before 30 June 1997. It also obliged the government to consult and have due regard to AUSSAT representations before imposing or varying carrier licence conditions, and to ensure equal obligations were imposed on carriers on particular issues. The government would be liable for payment of any losses incurred by Optus if the government acted contrary to the agreement.[301]
The next chapter of telecommunications reform was complete. Telecom and OTC were merged. AUSSAT was sold to form the basis of a new infrastructure competitor to the new AOTC - and was no longer the government's liability. Yet while that chapter of reform may be closed, the story is still far from over.
[176] Minister for Transport and Communications 1990 (hereinafter referred to as the `1990 Statement')
[177] Minutes of MAC Meeting, 22 January 1991, p. 2.
[178] Interview with Adam Smith, former Coordinator of the Consumers' Telecommunications Network.
[179] Prime Minister 1990, p. 1 and 3.
[180] Section 3, Telecommunications Act 1991.
[181] 1990 Statement, p. 2, Decision 2.
[182] See section 90 Telecommunications Act 1991.
[183] Vanessa Fanning [First Assistant Secretary, TPol] `The Proposed Changes', CIRCIT 1991a p. 8.
[184] AUSTEL, 1990a, pp 22-24, 30.
[185] V. Fanning, `The Proposed Changes' Op. Cit., p. 8.
[186] AUSTEL, 1990a p. 30.
[187] 1990 Statement, p. 11, Decision 63.
[188] Minister for Transport and Communications, 1991a, P. 1.
[189] MAC Minutes of the Tenth Meeting, 10 May 1991, p. 1.
[190] Sections 10 and 11, Telecommunications Act 1991. Subsequently, the Minister directed AUSTEL to report on the appropriate NTP.
[191] 1990 Statement, P. 2.
[192] Ibid, p. 14, Decision 81.
[193] Section 92, Telecommunications Act 1991.
[194] Fanning, `The Proposed Changes' Op. Cit., p. 8.
[195] MAC Minutes of the Eighth Meeting, 28 March, 1991, p. 2.
[196] 1990 Statement, p. 12, Decisions 65, 66, 70 and 71.
[197] Ibid, p. 12, Decisions 67 and 68.
[198] Fanning, `The Proposed Changes', Op. Cit, p. 9.
[199] Ibid.
[200] 1990 Statement, p. 13, Decisions 73 and 77.
[201] Ibid, p, 13, Decisions 75 and 76.
[202] AUSTEL, 1990a pp 30-43.
[203] Fanning, `The Proposed Changes' p. 9. In the legislation, the Minister was also given power to declare areas as `eligible combined areas' in which private networks could be constructed (section 16) and also direct AUSTEL on authorising non-carriers to install and maintain specified line links in specific situations (section 106).
[204] 1990 Statement, p. 12, Decisions 71 and 72.
[205] Australian Financial Review, August 14, 1990 p. 12.
[206] 1990 Statement, p. 8, Decision 44.
[207] AUSTEL's final reports, dated June 14,1991, included AUSTEL, Study of Arrangements and Charges for Interconnection and Equal Access: Economic and Commercial Considerations, Parts 1 and 2 (Part 2 of the report was the `Confidential Attachment to the Final Report to the Minister for Transport and Communications) and A Technical/Operational Framework for Interconnection and Equal Access.
[208] The first discussion paper, Economic and Commercial Issues of Interconnection, sought public comment by January 9. The next papers included Report on Customer Access Arrangements, released on 15 March, and Study of Arrangements and Charges for Interconnection and Equal Access: Economic and Commercial Considerations: Interim Report to the Minister for Transport and Communications, released for comment on 5 April.
[209] 1990 Statement, p. 5, Decisions 14-17.
[210] Ibid, Decision 18.
[211] For discussion of AUSTEL's recommendations on interconnect charges, see Arena 1991(then AUSTEL member) `.
[212] MAC Minutes of the Ninth Meeting, 22 April, 1991, p. 2.
[213] AUSTEL, 1991b Part 1, 14 June, 1991, p. 93.
[214] 1990 Statement, p. 4, Decision 4-12.
[215] Ibid, Decision 13.
[216] AUSTEL, 1991a, especially pp 34.46.
[217] For AUSTEL's final recommendations on customer access arrangements, see AUSTEL, Report to the Minister for Transport and Communications: A Technical/Operational Framework for Interconnection and Equal Access, June 14, 1991, p. 49.
[218] Letter from MAC Chairman Price to Minister Beazley dated 26 March 1991, saying the preferred option of the Committee was to provide access by a prefix for the second carrier only.
[219] 1990 Statement, p. 5.
[220] Ibid, p. 6, Decisions 19-21.
[221] Sections 80-86, Telecommunications Act 1991.
[222] 1990 Statement, p. 6, Decision 22.
[223] Optus has taken legal action against Telecom alleging some of Telecom's price discount options, including Flexi Plans and Strategic Partnership Agreements contravene the Act's price discrimination provisions. (Optus v Telstra (Federal Court in Sydney No. G100 of 1993) The price discrimination provisions of the Act have been amended by the Telecommunications Amendment Bill 1994.
[224] 1990 Statement, p. i.
[225] Prime Minister 1990, p. 5.
[226] 1990 Statement, p. 8, Decision 42.
[227] BTCE, 1989, p. 79. The cost of Telecom's providing loss making basic service and infrastructure in 1987/88 was set at approximately %$237 million, depending on the opportunity cost of capital. The losses incurred by Telecom in providing public payphones in 1987/88 was set at approximately $10 million. Telecom's provision of concessions to public institutions and people with disabilities for the same period was $5 million, with the Government welfare expenditure for telephones another $47 million in 1987/88/
[228] 1990 Statement, p. 9, Decision 53.
[229] MAC Minutes of Second Meeting, 31 January, 1991.
[230] 1990 Statement, p. 5, Decision 15.
[231] Ibid, p. 11, Decision 62.
[232] Minister for Transport and Communications, 1991b.
[233] Ibid, `Attachment' p. 1.
[234] Ibid, p. 3.
[235] The IDC Report cited the probable costs of CSOs as the levels set earlier by the BTCE Report, Ibid. p. 3.
[236] Ibid, p. 4.
[237] Ibid, p. 3.
[238] Ibid, pp 3-4.
[239] Ibid, main press release, p. 2.
[240] Ibid, Attachment, p. 4.
[241] MAC Minutes, Second Meeting, January 31, 1991.
[242] Ibid.
[243] Section 288 Telecommunications Act 1991.
[244] Section 5, Telecommunications Act 1991 defines a standard telephone service as a `public switched telephone service that is supplied by means of a carrier and is supplied by means of a telephone handset that does not have switching functions. Section 27 of the Australian Telecommunications Corporation Act simply said that `the public switched telephone service shall be the standard telephone service'.
[245] Interview Dr. Leo Dobes, Head of the Enterprise Policy Branch, TPol in DTC at the time.
[246] Divisions 2 to 6 of Part 13, Telecommunications Act 1991 cover the mechanisms for a universal service carrier(s) to claim for loss incurred in meeting its universal service obligation.
[247] Roger Price 1991a, p. 19.
[248] 1990 Statement, pp 6-7, Decisions 22-30.
[249] Sections 72 and 73, Telecommunications Act 1991.
[250] MAC Minutes, Eighth Meeting, 28 March 1991.
[251] Sections 20, 21, 23 and 24, Australian and Overseas Telecommunications Corporation Act 1991
[252] Australian and Overseas Telecommunications Corporation (Price Control Arrangements) Determination No. 1 of 1991, dated 2 September 1991.
[253] AOTC Carrier Charges Price Control Determination 1992, issued 26 June 1992.
[254] Section 197A Telecommunications Bill 1991, Exposure Draft.
[255] Section 399, Telecommunications Act 1991.
[256] Consumers' Telecommunications Network, 1991, p. 1.
[257] Telecommunications Bill 1991, Exposure Draft, Clause 21. However, the legislation did address the issue. Section 38(1) Telecommunications Act 1991 requires AUSTEL to ensure that `the provisions of this Act are carried out with due regard to the public interest'.
[258] Communications Law Centre, 1991, p. 9. A less detailed but similar process was also recommended in the CTN submission, p. 3.
[259] Part 14, Telecommunications Act 1991.
[260] The public inquiry process must be followed only when `prescribed carrier obligations' are set or varied. (section 69 Telecommunications Act 1991.)
[261] CTN 1991 p. 5 and CLC 1991 p. 9. The legislation did give AUSTEL power to develop indicative performance standards for the quality of the standard telephone service (section 38 Telecommunications Act 1991). The Act also listed as a possible licence condition on carriers a requirement on how carriers are to maintain quality in the supply of telecommunications services (section 63(h) Telecommunications Act 1991). However, such a licence condition has not yet been imposed on carriers.
[262] Telecommunications (General Telecommunications Licences) Declaration (No. 2) of 1991.
[263] 1990 Statement, pp 7-8, Decisions 31-43.
[264] For discussion of AUSTEL's additional powers, see AUSTEL 1991c pp 9-13.
[265] MAC Minutes of Seventh Meeting, 13 March 1991.
[266] MAC Minutes of Eighth Meeting, 28 March, 1991.
[267] Australian Financial Review, August 14, 1990, p. 12.
[268] Ibid.
[269] 1990 Statement, p. 14, Decision 82.
[270] Letter from MAC Chairman Price to the Minister for Transport and Communications, 22 March, 1991.
[271] 1990 Statement, p. 3, Decision 1
[272] Ibid, p. 9, Decision 44-46.
[273] Ibid, p 9, Decisions 47 -52.
[274] Ibid, Decisions 54-55.
[275] Minister for Transport and Communications, 1991c, p. 3.
[276] Section 26 AOTC Act, says that AOTC is taken `not to have been incorporated or established for a public purpose', not to be `a public authority or instrumentality or agency of the Crown' and not entitled `to any immunity or privilege of the Commonwealth' except as provided for in legislation.
[277] Section 116, Telecommunications Act 1991 allows specified carriers to engage in exempt activities despite state and territory laws. AUSTEL held an inquiry into what should be contained in the National Code and reported in 1992. Statutory Rules 1991 No. 1, Telecommunications (Exempt Activities) Regulations spell out the `exempt activities' which include essentially construction and maintenance, alteration or demolition of network infrastructure.
[278] Section 117, Telecommunications Act 1991.
[279] Press Statement 18A/91, 17 April 1991, p.. 3.
[280] For example, jurisdiction for Freedom of Information and Ombudsman legislation depends on the body being a government `agency' or formed for a `public purpose'. To remedy the problem, the government passed regulations to include AOTC within the ambit of FOI, Ombudsman and EEO legislation. However, the Privacy Act's jurisdiction no longer covers AOTC.
[281] See Administrative Review Council, Discussion Paper: Administrative Review of Government Business Enterprises, pp 66-68.
[282] Press Statement 18A/91 p. 3.
[283] "Update", Australian Communications, July 1991, p. 10. The merger was complete by February 1992 when the assets of the two companies were merged. The 13 Directors of the new company were appointed in December, 1991.
[284] 1990 Statement, p. 3, Decision 3.
[285] Ibid, p. 10, Decisions 59-61.
[286] Ibid, Decisions 56-58.
[287] Ibid, p. 13, Decision 78.
[288] Section 6, AUSSAT Amendment Act 1991 (assented to on 21 January 1991 and commenced operation 24 April 1991.)
[289] Minister for Transport and Communications, Opening Address at CIRCIT 1991b, p. 12.
[290] Fist 1991, p. 35.
[291] Beazley 1991, p. 1.
[292] See for example, M. Smeaton , in `Viewpoint, Australian Communications, March 1991, p. 6. In the same issue, see also P. 12 where the commentator suggests there was only one genuine bidder - a Cable & Wireless consortium.
[293] Minister for Transport and Communications, `The Key Steps Toward Successful Implementation: A Progress Report and Current Assessment', Implementing the New Telecommunications Policy: From Words to Deeds: Proceedings of a CIRCIT Conference, 15 March, 1991, p. 16.
[294] Section 5, AUSSAT Repeal Act 1991.
[295] Section 6 and 9, AUSSAT Repeal Act 1991.
[296] Section 10, AUSSAT Repeal Act 1991.
[297] Optus' Australian shareholders (totalling 51% of shareholders) included Mayne Nickless, AMP and National Mutual, with Cable & Wireless and Bell South each holding 24.5% of the shares.
[298] Clause 3, Licence to Operate as a General Telecommunications Carrier [granted to AUSSAAT Pty Ltd], dated 22 November, 1991.
[299] Ibid, Clause 4.
[300] Australian Communications, February, 1992, p. 25/6.
[301] Deed of Agreement between the Commonwealth of Australia and AUSSAT Pty Ltd under Section 70 of the Telecommunications Act relating to General Licences and Conditions, dated 31 January, 1992.